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INTRODUCTION
With the European Union ("EU") expanding, secular Europe finds
itself faced with an increasingly religious populace. Recent debates
over headscarves and legislation on religion illustrate Europe's
discomfort in making room for its religious minorities.' Relieving
this discomfort, however, may not be as difficult as the EU
anticipates, largely because the framework to do so is already in
place.
As the first multi-national European organization formed at the
end of the Second World War, the Council of Europe (the "Council")
has already taken the first steps towards Winston Churchill's vision
of a "United States of Europe." 2 Through a series of conventions,
monitoring bodies, and an influential and well-respected court, the
Council of Europe has developed the strongest human rights
enforcement mechanism in the world today.3 As Europe grows ever

1. See, e.g., Trials of Tolerance, TIMES (London), Feb. 11, 2004, at 19
(discussing France's controversial policy of banning the Muslim headscarf in
public schools); see also Sorry Tales of the Cross and the Veil: We Should Assert
Universal Values, Not Spread Moral Panic, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at 8
(describing the varied and misguided strategies addressing immigrant integration
that have contributed to growing tensions in Europe).
2. See Heinrich Klebes, Membership in International Organizations and
National ConstitutionalLaw: A Case Study of the Law and Practice of the Council
of Europe, 99 ST. LOUIS-WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. 69, 71 (1999) (crediting
the eventual development of a community of values based on democracy, rule of
law, and human rights to Churchill's efforts).
3. See Jonathan L. Black-Branch, Observing and Enforcing Human Rights
Under the Council of Europe: The Creation of a Permanent European Court of
Human Rights, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1, 7 (1996) (acknowledging that scholars and
lawyers have widely recognized the Council of Europe's Convention on Human
Rights as the "world's most successful system of international protection of human
rights and one of the most advanced forms of international legal process" (quoting
MARK W. JANIS & RICHARD S. KAY, EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 23 (1990))).
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more diverse, the Council of Europe stands to play an increasingly
important role in protecting the rights of Europe's population.4
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("Human Rights Convention")5 emerged shortly after the
Council's inception. 6 It laid out the fundamental rights of individuals,
including the right to religion, and established the European Court of
Human Rights ("ECHR" or the "Court").7 Despite the Human Rights
Convention's great advances in human rights protections, it has been
less successful in protecting the rights of religious minorities.8 To

compensate for this weakness and to handle issues arising from
Europe's burgeoning minority population, the Council of Europe
drafted the Framework Convention for the Protection of National
Minorities
("FCPNM" or "Framework Convention").'
The
Framework Convention outlines in detail the rights of national
minorities, including religious minorities, and the duties of States to
4. See Grdinne de Bdrca, On Enlargement of the European Union: Beyond the
Charter: How Enlargement Has Enlarged the Human Rights Policy of the
European Union, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 679, 684-86 (2004) (finding that while
the European Communities focused primarily on economic integration, the Council
of Europe assumed the bulk of the responsibility for EU human rights policy); see
also Elizabeth Shaver Duquette, Human Rights in the European Union: Internal
Versus External Objectives, 34 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 363, 372 (2001) (asserting that
notwithstanding the European Community's ("EC") inability to accede to the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the EC
should "vigorously protect and promote human rights and democracy throughout
its territory").
5. Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953,
Europ. T.S. No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human
Rights].
6. See Christin J. Albertie, The Act on Hungarians Living Abroad: A
Misguided Approach to Minority Protection, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 961, 972-73
(2003).
7. See Black-Branch, supra note 3, at 8 (recognizing the Human Rights
Convention's influence in developing other regional human rights bodies,
including the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights). See generally Dinah
Shelton, The Boundaries of Human Rights Jurisdiction in Europe, 13 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 95, 98-99 (2003) (tracing the history of the establishment of
mechanisms designed to ensure the protection of human rights laid out in the
Human Rights Convention).
8. See Albertie, supra note 6, at 973-74 (correlating the ECHR's inadequate
protection of minority rights to its narrow view of protection as solely in reference
to discrimination).
9. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Feb.
1995, Europ. T.S. No. 157 [hereinafter FCPNM].
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uphold these rights.' ° The FCPNM's impact, however, is greatly
diminished by a weak enforcement mechanism comprised of stateauthored compliance reports and non-binding recommendations from
the FCPNM's monitoring body, the Advisory Committee, and the
Committee of Ministers. 1'
This Comment argues that although the Human Rights Convention
and the FCPNM currently provide inadequate protection to religious
minorities, 2 with changes to the FCPNM's enforcement mechanism
and expansion of the European Court of Human Rights' case law on
the free practice of religion, the Council of Europe may more
efficiently address the problems faced by religious minorities in
Europe. Part I discusses Europe's minority issues, the protections
afforded by both conventions, and the ways in which issues are
addressed under each. Part II analyzes the effectiveness of the
conventions' protection of rights of religious minorities and explores
the ways in which the conventions complement and undermine one
another. Part III recommends ways to improve the current system of
minority protection by strengthening the integration of the two
instruments to enhance the protections afforded to religious
minorities. This Comment concludes that improvements to the
FCPNM's monitoring mechanisms and additions to ECHR's

10. See Christopher J. Miner, Losing My Religion: Austria's New Religion Law
in Light of International and European Standards of Religious Freedom, 1998
BYU L. REV. 607, 633 (1998) (advancing that the FCPNM's link between national
minorities and religious rights underscores the reality that national minorities are
often religious minorities too); see also Zdenka Machnyikova, Article 7, in THE
RIGHTS OF MINORITIES IN EUROPE 218 (Marc Weller ed., 2005) (acknowledging
the role that religion and religious beliefs play in enabling national minorities to
maintain and develop their identities).
11. But see Christopher Ward, Book Note, Majoring in Minorities: Minority
Rights in Europe, 24 MELB. U. L. REV. 530, 533 (2000) (conceding that the
FCPNM's reporting mechanism may function as a means of encouraging
modification of state behavior, even though the mechanism is arguably weak as
compared to a quasi-judicial system); Albertie, supra note 6, at 984 (noting that the
FCPNM has, in fact, influenced the composition of bilateral treaties on the
treatment of national minorities).
12. See Maxine Sleeper, Anti-DiscriminationLaws in Eastern Europe: Toward
Effective Implementation, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 177, 178 (2001)
(acknowledging that the challenge faced by Europe's governing bodies in
protecting the rights of religious minorities requires Member States to undertake
legislative reform).
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jurisprudence are necessary to accommodate Europe's religious
minority populations.13

I. BACKGROUND
The Council of Europe was established with the goal of codifying
Europe's shared values of democracy and human rights. 14 The
Council embraced the responsibility of ensuring that basic legal
standards were in place to enforce those shared values, thereby
developing its human rights jurisprudence through a series of
conventions adopted to address inadequacies in domestic legal
systems.15 Although other international agreements have taken
precedence over many of the Council's instruments, the Council
16
remains a driving force in human rights protection.
A. EUROPE'S RELIGIOUS MINORITY ISSUES
Over the past twenty-five years Europe has experienced a surge of
immigration, and, with it, a wave of discrimination based on
language, religion and ethnicity. 7 Discrimination has occurred in
particular against Muslims immigrating to states committed to
secularism, but has by no means been confined to Islam.18 Many

13. See David Wippman, Human Rights on the Eve of the Next Century:
Aspects of Human Rights Implementation: The Evolttion and Implementation of

Minority Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 597, 611-12 (1997) (arguing that, as it
currently stands, the FCPNM's use of imprecise and vague language results in the
creation of obligations for Contracting States instead of the delineation of
enforceable individual rights).
14. See Peter Leuprecht, Innovations in the European System of Human Rights
Protection:Is Enlargement Compatible with Reinforcement?, 8 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 313, 313-14 (1998).

15. See Klebes, supra note 2, at 71-72 (providing that the democratic and
constitutional norms of the Council of Europe have served as a yardstick by which
potential new Member States are measured).
16. See, e.g., Duquette, supra note 4, at 381 (contending that the EU has built
upon the work of the Council of Europe, incorporating respect for human rights
into its legal system through the Model Human Rights Clause).
17. See Trials of Tolerance, supra note 1, at 19 (recognizing that an estimated
five million Muslims have immigrated into France alone).
18.

See Ira Rifkin, Europe Targets Minority Religious Groups, THE TIMES

June 19, 1999, at El (noting that discrimination has occurred against
religious minorities including the Amish, Jehovah's Witnesses, Wiccans, Hare
UNION,
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European states have classified smaller religious groups as sects or
cults that endanger society, despite the questionable existence of any
threat. 19
Outward expression of religious beliefs, particularly through dress,
has come to the forefront of public debate in Europe. While the
majority of Western European countries have addressed religious
attire in public schools, 2° the debate has been most prominent in
France, where secularism is viewed as integral to the state structure.
Wearing headscarves in French public schools has been the subject
of heated discourse, prompting the adoption of legislation prohibiting
students from wearing religious attire in primary and secondary
schools.
B. THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AND THE PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS

MINORITIES

The Human Rights Convention, which came into force on
September 3, 1953, was drafted with the intention of creating a
legally binding convention with corollary institutions to protect
human rights.22 The Human Rights Convention reaffirmed Europe's
commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
further elaborated Europe's commitment to human rights

Krishnas, Seventh-day Adventists, Scientologists, Hindus, Buddhists, Satmar
Hasidic Jews, Baha'is, and Mormons).
19. See James T. Richardson & Massimo Introvigne, "Brainwashing" Theories
in European Parliamentaryand Administrative Reports on "Cults" and "Sects",
40 J. SCI. STUDY OF RELIGION 143, 144 (2001) (referencing French and Belgian
parliamentary reports listing groups such as Mormons, Quakers, and Baha'is as
cults or sects that posed a threat to society).
20. See Sahin v. Turkey, (2005) 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8,
55-65 (noting that
following varying degrees of public and legal debate, Belgium, Austria, Germany,
the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom permit
Islamic headscarves to be worn in classrooms).
21. Law No. 2004-228 of Mar. 15, 2004, J.O. 65, Mar. 17, 2004, p. 5190.
22. See Mikael Rask Madsen, From Cold War Instrument to Supreme
European Court: The European Court of Human Rights at the Crossroads of
International and National Law and Politics, 32 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 137, 140-41
(2007) (observing that the legally binding nature of the Human Rights Convention
was largely a reaction to the soft legal institutions supporting the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).
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protection.2 3 Under Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention, the
24
right to religious freedom includes the freedom to change religion
and the freedom from discrimination based on religious beliefs. 2 The

freedom to "manifest religious beliefs" in Article 9 is subject to
limitations only as prescribed by law or necessary to allow the
government to maintain order.26 The rights guaranteed in the Human
Rights Convention are individual-rather than group-rights.
C. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The Human Rights Convention established the ECHR as a
supplement to domestic legal remedies. 8 The Court ensures that
Member States observe their responsibilities under the Human Rights
Convention, and its jurisdiction is limited to matters foreseen by the

23. See Black-Branch, supra note 3, at 7 (recognizing that the intention of the
Human Rights Convention was to provide the infrastructure to protect the rights
outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
24. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 9 (protecting
the worship of, teaching of, practice of, observance of, and the freedom to change
religions as manifestations of religious beliefs).
25. See id. art. 14.
26. See id. art. 9(2) (designating the permissible reasons for limiting religious
rights as those necessary for the maintenance of public safety, public order, health
or morals, or protection of others' rights and freedoms); see also Kokkinakis v.
Greece, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
33 (1993) (interpreting the article's
limitations as allowing democratic societies the discretion to place restrictions
upon the freedom to manifest religion or belief when it is necessary to reconcile
various groups' interests and to ensure that everyone's beliefs are respected).
27. See Charles F. Furtado, Jr., Guess Who's Coming to Dinner? Protectionfor
National Minorities in Eastern and Central Europe under the Council of Europe,
34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 333, 338 (2003) (acknowledging that minority
groups must articulate their claims as violations of individual rights to have
standing under the Human Rights Convention).
28. See European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 38; see also
Leuprecht, supra note 14, at 316 (explaining that the Convention of Human Rights
and its mechanisms, namely the disbanded European Commission of Human
Rights and remaining ECHR, provide a subsidiary international guarantee which
any person can invoke in appealing national decisions); J.A. Andrews, The
European Jurisprudence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REv. 463, 468 (1984)
(lauding the Human Rights Convention as the first international legal instrument to
both guarantee individual rights and provide a means to enforce them, originally
through individual petitions to the now defunct European Commission of Human
Rights and now, directly, through the European Court of Human Rights).
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2
Although the Court primarily decides issues of civil
Convention9.
and political rights, the Court has addressed issues of economic,
social, and cultural rights3" and may issue advisory opinions on the
interpretation of the Human Rights Convention and its protocols.3
Signing and ratifying the Human Rights Convention has become a
defacto requirement for joining the Council of Europe.32 Prospective
Member States must reform their laws to conform to the values set
forth by the Human Rights Convention and submit to the jurisdiction
of the ECHR.33 States have incorporated the Human Rights
Convention into their legal systems to varying degrees, but most
States party to the Human Rights Convention have modified their
legal systems as a result of acceding to the Human Rights
Convention.34 Moreover, the ECHR has enjoyed a high rate of
Member State compliance with its decisions.35

29. See Klebes, supra note 2, at 77 (distinguishing the broad scope of the
European Court of Justice and the more narrow scope of the ECHR whose
decisions are bound by the framework of the Human Rights Convention).
30. See Leuprecht, supra note 14, at 315.
31. See Protocol No. 11 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 1, 1998, Europ. T.S. No. 155, art.
47 [hereinafter Protocol No. 11] (mandating that advisory opinions may not
address questions relating to the content or scope of the rights or freedoms defined
in Section 1 of the Human Rights Convention or with any other question which
might be considered in the course of any proceeding instituted in accordance with
the Convention).
32. See Shelton, supra note 7, at 97 (explaining that the Statute of the Council
of Europe mandates that each Member State accept the principles of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in its jurisdiction).
33. See Klebes, supra note 2, at 76 (emphasizing that candidate states have a
limited time period to ratify the Human Rights Convention and adapt domestic
legislation after acceding to the Council).
34. See Andrews, supra note 28, at 479-80 (attesting that while some states
have incorporated the Human Rights Convention into domestic law or given the
Human Rights Convention the weight of constitutional law, others have not
adopted the Human Rights Convention into their domestic law in any manner).
35. See Klebes, supra note 2, at 78-79 (noting that the European Court of
Human Rights has handed down roughly 800 judgments and ensured a high level
of compliance by adapting its interpretation of the Human Rights Convention to
changing societal needs).
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D. THE RIGHT TO RELIGION IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS' JURISPRUDENCE

The ECHR's jurisprudence has expanded along with Europe's
population,36 and the Court has taken a more active role in protecting
the rights outlined in the Human Rights Convention. 37 The degree of
the Court's success in protecting the rights of religious minorities,
however, is questionable, as illustrated by the following two
examples.
1.Religious Attire
The issue of headscarves in educational institutions came before
the ECHR in Leyla Sahin v. Turkey.38 Sahin was suspended from
Istanbul University for failing to abide by regulations prohibiting
students from wearing clothing "that symbolise[s] or manifest[s] any
religion, faith, race, or political or ideological persuasion in any
institution or department of the University .... Sahin claimed that
the school's prohibition interfered with her right to manifest religious
beliefs under Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention. 40 Despite
acknowledging that the ban interfered with Sahin's right to practice
her religion,41 the Court found that the interference was justified by a
legitimate legislative interest in secularism 42 and proportional to
43
reaching this legislative interest.

36. See CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 15-16 (2001) (tallying that the Court received
only 2,088 applications from 1955 to 1964, yet received nearly quadruple the
number, 8,396, in 1999 alone).
37. See id. at 16 (underscoring the importance of the development of clear
admissibility standards by the Court in light of the expanding caseload and time
pressures and constraints).
38. Sahin v. Turkey, (2005) 41 Eur. H.R. Rep. 8.
39. Id. 45.
40. Id. 14.
41. Id. 71 (proceeding on the assumption that the University's restrictions on
the applicant's right to wear the Islamic headscarf amounted to an interference
with her right to manifest her religion).
42. See id. 7 104-106 (asserting that the principles of secularism and equality
not only complement each other, but are consistent with the Human Rights
Convention's permissible limitations).
43. See id. TT 110-111 (observing that the measures treated all forms of
religious dress equally in banning them from campus).
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2. Greek National Day Cases
The Court has decided two cases concerning the forced
participation of Greek Jehovah's Witnesses in elementary school
National Day parades." The facts of the cases are substantially
similar: school children were forced, against their pacifist religious
beliefs, to participate in parades commemorating the war between
Greece and fascist Italy. 45 Both children protested participating and
filed suit after being forced to participate, alleging violations of
Article 9.46 In Valsamis v. Greece, the ECHR held that the parade
could not viewed as an attempt to indoctrinate the child with views
or beliefs contrary to those of her parents, and that therefore the
forced participation was not an interference with her right to religion

under Article 9.47 In Efstratiou v. Greece, the Court held that because
the purpose of the parade was to celebrate freedom and democracy
and not to glorify war, the forced participation of the child did not
amount to an interference with the child's freedom of religion.48
E. THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
NATIONAL MINORITIES AND THE RIGHT TO RELIGION

Drafted in response to the collapse of the communist regimes in
Central and Eastern Europe, the FCPNM entered into force in 1998. 49

44. See Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1996);
Efstratiou v. Greece, App. No. 24095/94, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1996) (judgments
delivered on the same day).
45. See Valsamis, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1996), T 8-10; Efstratiou, 24 Eur.
H.R. Rep. 294 (1996), TT 9-11.
46. See Valsamis, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1996), TT 18, 42-44 (advancing the
argument that Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention guarantees a right to a
negative freedom not to manifest convictions or opinions contrary to one's own
religious beliefs); Efstratiou, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1996), 18.
50-51 (holding that
47. See Valsamis, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1996),
religious convictions cannot be used as a basis to ignore a rule that is applied to
everyone in the same manner).
48. See Efstratiou, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 294 (1996), IT 38-39 (intimating that if
the purpose of the holiday was to express bellicose feelings or glorify military
conflict, forced participation would offend the child's pacifist beliefs).
49. See Leuprecht, supra note 14, at 323 (observing that the FCPNM is the first
legally binding multilateral instrument to outline protections for national
minorities); see also John R. Valentine, Toward a Definition of NationalMinority,
32 DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 445, 461 (2004) (recognizing the emerging and
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Prospective Member States must ratify and implement the FCPNM,
and non-member States must participate in the implementation
mechanism prior to joining the Council of Europe. 0 Currently, four
Member States have not yet ratified the FCPNM; three have yet to
sign the FCPNM.5" The FCPNM further elaborates the rights of
national minorities and expands the duties of the Member States to
uphold them. 2 The FCPNM requires that States encourage the
development of an environment in which religious minorities may
develop and flourish53 by refraining from instituting assimilationist
policies;54 encouraging intercultural dialogue;55 protecting minorities
from violence, threats of violence, and acts of discrimination;56 and
making no policies hindering communication among religious
minorities.57 The rights protected under the FCPNM are individual

profound issues of the largely ignored minority groups of the communist countries
of Eastern Europe).
50. See FCPNM, supra note 9, art. 24.
51. See Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications,
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT = 157&CM=&DF =
&CL=ENG (last visited Mar. 17, 2008) (Belgium, Greece, Iceland, and
Luxembourg have signed the FCPNM but have not ratified it while Turkey,
France, and Monaco have neither signed nor ratified the FCPNM).
52. See Furtado, supra note 27, at 361-62 (stating that the FCPNM challenges
Member States to promote full and effective equality between minority and
majority populations by promoting conditions necessary to preserve minority
cultural identity).
53. See FCPNM, supra note 9, pmbl. (espousing that a genuinely democratic
society should not only respect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity
of national minorities, but also create conditions enabling them to express,
preserve and develop this identity); id. art. 5 (demanding the preservation of
essential elements of national minorities such as language, traditions and cultural
heritage).
54. See id. art. 5.2; see also Wippman, supra note 13, at 606 (discussing
banning policies or practices aimed at involuntary assimilation).
55. See FCPNM, supra note 9, art. 6 ("The Parties shall ... take effective
measures to promote mutual respect and understanding and co-operation among all
persons living on their territory,... in particular in the fields of education, culture,
and the media.").
56. See id. art. 6.
57. See id. art. 9 (asserting the right to access media, to receive and impart
information and ideas in the minority language, and to use print and broadcast
media).
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rights which could potentially be adjudicated in the ECHR, although
the Court's mandate does not extend to such rights.58
F. THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
NATIONAL MINORITIES' ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM

The Council of Europe relies on State legislative action and an
informal reporting system to implement and enforce the FCPNM.59
Upon ratifying the FCPNM, States must undertake legislative review
and reform to implement the terms of the FCPNM.6 ° States must
submit regular reports regarding all measures, legislative or
otherwise, undertaken to achieve the principles of the FCPNM to the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe,61 who in turn forwards
the reports to an Advisory Committee.62 Using both the information
submitted in the State's report and information gathered from news
reports, non-governmental organizations ("NGOs"), and interested
parties, the Advisory Committee authors an opinion and makes
recommendations to the Committee of Ministers on the adequacy of
the report. 63 The Committee of Ministers then issues
recommendations to the State.64 Yet, the Committee of Ministers'
power to enforce its recommendations is unclear. Moreover, the
58. See Elena A. Baylis, Minority Rights, Minority Wrongs, 10 UCLA J. INT'L
L. & FOREIGN AFF. 66, 84 (2005) (emphasizing that designing protections to
accrue to the individual, rather than to the minority group, limits the scope and
character of communal protections available).
59. See Furtado, supra note 27, at 364 (conceding that despite the extensive
rights outlined by the FCPNM, the FCPNM's language rarely obligates Member
States to take the prescribed measures).
60. See Sleeper, supra note 12, at 184 (stressing that rather than setting out
specific means of performance or enforcement, the FCPNM relies mainly on a
reporting mechanism as the primary means of enforcement).
61. See FCPNM, supra note 9, art. 25.
62. See id. art. 26 (mandating that the Advisory Committee be composed of
individuals with recognized expertise in the field of the protection of national
minorities chosen by the Committee of Ministers).
63. See Gerd Oberleitner, Monitoring Minority Rights Under the Council of
Europe's Framework Convention, in MINORITY RIGHTS INTHE "NEW" EUROPE 82
(Peter Cumper & Steven Wheatley eds., 1999) (arguing that NGOs and
international organizations may be used to encourage submission of State reports
by allowing the Advisory Committee to gather information on its own).
64. See de Btirca, supra note 4, at 711 (indicating that the purpose of the
Advisory Committee is to facilitate and participate in an ongoing, consultative
dialogue with Member States).
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FCPNM provides no right of petition for individuals, minority
groups, or other States seeking to bring complaints against a State
party under the FCPNM.6 5

G. THE RIGHT TO RELIGION IN ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORTS
Given that the FCPNM's Advisory Committee issues opinions in
response to State-authored reports rather than contested issues, the
opinions of the Advisory Committee tend to be general and broadly
worded.66 The opinions essentially review the State's report for

credibility of the assertions made67 and assess the State's efforts in
implementing the FCPNM.6 8 If the opinion notes a weakness in the
State's protections, it also makes general recommendations as to how

the State may correct them.69 When given, the recommendations are
typically general, suggesting that the State increase its vigilance, 0
work towards practical solutions,7" and ensure that procedures aimed

65. See Sleeper, supra note 12, at 184.
66. See Furtado, supra note 27, at 368-69 (characterizing the language of the
Advisory Opinions as little more than "diplomatic niceties" with little direct
criticism); see, e.g., Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Azerbaian 116 (Jan. 26, 2004)
(suggesting general reforms of the education system); Advisory Committee on the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on the
United Kingdom 106 (Nov. 30, 2001) (recommending that the United Kingdom
"consider the inclusion" of minorities).
67. See Opinion on Azerbaijan, supra note 66, 25 (noting that Azerbaijan's
statement that no known instances of intolerance had occurred in Azerbaijan's
history was contradicted by a number of credible reports of such instances).
68. See, e.g., Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Switzerland 31 (Feb. 20, 2003)
(finding the State's efforts to protect linguistic and religious minorities
satisfactory); Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Ireland 27 (May 22, 2003)
(approving of the two Acts implemented to (1) eradicate employment
discrimination based on, among other things, religion or race; and (2) ensure equal
status among all people).
69. See generally Opinion on the United Kingdom, supra note 66, 61
(recommending that the State examine additional measures aimed at reducing
discrimination).
70. See Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities, Opinion on Ukraine 38 (Mar. 1, 2002) (urging continuous
vigilance over the interconfessional tension in Crimea).
71. See Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities, Opinion on Sweden 80 (Aug. 25, 2002) (recommending a
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at protecting religious minorities are functioning properly.7 2 Even in
instances in which protections for religious minorities are lacking or
worsening, the language of the Advisory Committee rarely increases
in strength or specificity.73 The vague wording of these reports
jeopardizes the effectiveness of the FCPNM and illustrates a crucial
weakness inherent in the Framework: the Advisory Committee's lack
of authority to compel states to respond or comply with its
recommendations.74
Despite the vague wording of its opinions, the Advisory
Committee has become more thorough and pointed in its analysis in
its second round of opinions. For example, in its initial opinion on
Moldova, the Advisory Committee noted problems with
discrimination against religious minorities in the media, yet
concluded that the media could adequately police itself through
existing watchdog groups.75 In its second opinion on Moldova, the
Advisory Committee acknowledged problems with Moldova's laws
search for pragmatic solutions in the implementation of legislation concerning the
circumcision of boys in an effort to balance legitimate governmental aims and
freedom of Jewish minorities to practice their religion).
72. See Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities, Opinion on Spain 55 (Aug. 25, 2002) (urging authorities
to take all necessary steps to counter instances of religious intolerance escalating in
violence against minorities by the local population).
73. See Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities, Opinion on the Russian Federation 64 (Sept. 13, 2002)
(recognizing the occurrence of vandalism to cemeteries and minority religious sites
and expressing the "wish" that the government pay more attention to prevention
and investigation of such incidents); Advisory Committee on the Framework
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Opinion on Romania
35,
38, 42 (Apr. 6, 2001) (finding that the government failed to protect persons from
discrimination and hostility under the FCPNM, yet concluding only that it
"should" support media programming dealing with minority groups accurately and
fairly).
74. See Sleeper, supra note 12, at 184 (contending that the State reporting
system limits the effectiveness of the FCPNM in enforcing the rights of national
minorities because it allows for neither an interstate complaint procedure nor a
right of petition for individuals or minority groups); see also Peter G. Danchin,
U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious Freedom: the
Multilateral Approach, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 99-100 (arguing that
although the Human Rights Convention protects freedom of religion more
effectively than other international instruments, it does not, expressly protect
religious minorities).
75. See Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities, Opinion on Moldova TT 47, 50 (Mar. 1, 2002).
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on registration of religious groups and recognized that Moldovan law
76
enforcement officers were restricting free practice of religion. It
seems unlikely that the latter problems arose only after the
publication of the first report, suggesting that in its second opinion
the Advisory Committee is asserting more authority.

II. ANALYSIS
Despite its success in enforcing individual human rights, the
Human Rights Convention has been less successful at enforcing the
rights of religious minorities.77 The FCPNM more successfully
elaborates the rights of religious minorities and the duties of Member
States to protect them, but falls short in enforcing these rights.78 Both
instruments, however, stand to play an increased and longer-term
role in working with Member States toward effective protection of
religious minorities.7 9
A. THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
NATIONAL MINORITIES ADDRESSES THE DEFICIENCIES IN THE
HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION'S PROTECTIONS OF RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES
By expanding the rights outlined in the Human Rights
Convention, the FCPNM underscores its deficiencies.80 For example,
the provisions of the Human Rights Convention are too general to

76. Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of
National Minorities, Second Opinion on Moldova 78-79 (May 24, 2005).
77. See EVANS, supra note 36, at 78 (observing that a State must act very
repressively before the ECHR will intervene in issues where the relationship to the
practice of religion is subtle).
78. See Wippman, supra note 13, at 611 (noting that "the more generally
applicable and strongly worded a minority rights instrument is . . . the less it is
likely to contain specifically enforceable obligations").
79. See Baylis, supra note 58, at 137-38 (positing that regional systems and
structures are well-suited to address minority rights).
80. See Furtado, supra note 27, at 361-62 (finding that the FCPNM addresses
two of the major drawbacks of the Human Rights Convention: (1) the absence of
explicit recognition and protection for minority rights; and (2) the insufficiently
broad interpretation of rights); see also id. at 358 (declaring that the FCPNM's
comprehensive protections and the specificity of its signatories' obligations are a
milestone for the Council of Europe).
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adequately address the realities of protecting religious minorities.8
The FCPNM fills the gaps left by the Human Rights Convention by
recognizing that protection of religious minorities requires not only
expanded protections, but also affirmative duties of Member States
to ensure unimpeded religious practice.8 2
The general protections afforded by the Human Rights Convention
to religious minorities are lacking in several important respects.8 3
The right protected by the Convention is the right not to be
discriminated against for practicing or changing one's religion.84
However, simply barring direct interference
or outright
discrimination against religious minorities does not provide complete
protection of the freedom of religion. As illustrated by Sahin and the
Greek National Day cases, States may act in ways that infringe upon
freedom of religion without direct interference, outright
discrimination, or the intent to discriminate. 5 In focusing on the
legislative intent of the policies and events in question, the Court
failed to address an issue central to each cases: the right to
unimpeded manifestation of religious belief. Sahin illustrates the
deference the Court gives to State discretion in limiting religion, and
the Greek National Day cases suggest that the Human Rights
Convention does not recognize freedom of religion beyond

81. See EVANS, supra note 36, at 2 (contending that the bodies responsible for
protecting freedom of religion and belief under the Human Rights Convention
have done so in an incoherent and inconsistent manner, developing principles more
favorable to States and giving little consideration to the importance of religious
freedom and belief).
82. See Baylis, supra note 58, at 73 (suggesting that without "measures
specifically designed to address minority groups, ordinary state institutions and
processes may not offer effective avenues for minority groups to raise their

concerns").
83. See Andrews, supra note 28, at 474-75 (intimating that compromises
among the Human Rights Convention drafters resulted in a hierarchy of rights,
laying out broadly-stated non-derogable rights followed by specifically worded
qualified rights).
84. See Black-Branch, supra note 3, at 9 (characterizing the right to religious
freedom as a protective right, meant to protect the individual against wrongs
perpetrated by the Member State).
85. See Furtado, supra note 27, at 361 (noting that the Human Rights
Convention's lack of explicit recognition and protection for minority rights
weakens security for national minorities by allowing States discretion in
implementing protections).
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protection from direct interference or outright discrimination based
on religious beliefs.86
Finally, the Human Rights Convention does not suggest how
rights should be protected.87 Consequently, the Human Rights
Convention's allowance of certain limitations on the rights of
religious minorities in order to maintain public order jeopardizes the
protections afforded by the Human Rights Convention, as States
retain the sole discretion to determine what is necessary to maintain
public order.88 Despite requiring that all limitations be prescribed by
law, pursue a legitimate aim, and be necessary in a democratic
society,8 9 States retain significant discretion in limiting the practice
of minority religions.
By placing affirmative duties on the State, the FCPNM addresses
the deficiencies of the Human Rights Convention in protecting
religious minorities. 90 The FCPNM extends the duties of states
beyond simply prohibiting discrimination by requiring states to foster
a climate in which religious minorities may flourish.9' While some
commentators have criticized the FCPNM's failure to vest states

86. See EVANS, supra note 36, at 69 (advancing the argument that the Human
Rights Convention primarily obliges States to refrain from interfering with the free
practice of religion, rather than to create conditions for religious practice to
flourish).
87. But see European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 5, art. 9(2)
(declaring only that a State may limit freedom of religion when doing so is
necessary to protect society as a whole).
88. See Miner, supra note 10, at 634 (explaining that ECHR case law makes
clear that States may interfere with the right of religious freedom provided their
aim in doing so is both legitimate and reasonably proportional to the necessity of
the situation).
89. See Thomas Giegerich, Freedom of Religion as a Source of Claims to
Equality and Problemsfor Equality, 34 ISR. L. REV. 211, 222-23 (2000) (implying
that the ECHR grants States party to the Human Rights Convention broad
discretion in scrutinizing whether limitations imposed on the freedom of
expression are necessary for the protection of freedom of religion).
90. See Miner, supra note 10, at 633 (noting that the FCPNM goes beyond
merely protecting religious minorities' rights by affirmatively requiring countries
to ensure national minorities' freedom of religion and freedom of religious
manifestation).
91. See FCPNM, supra note 9, arts. 5-6, 9 (requiring protection from threats or
acts of discrimination, hostility, or violence based on national minority status;
prohibiting assimiliationist policies; and ensuring unimpeded communication
between national minorities).
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with the means to limit the rights of religious minorities in the name
of public order,9 2 others have praised its significant advances in
protecting religious minorities.9 3
B. BOTH THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONVENTION AND THE FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES
FAIL TO ADEQUATELY ENFORCE THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES

While the FCPNM takes bold steps towards improving the
protection of religious minorities, its enforcement mechanism falls
far short of permitting any meaningful oversight of the
implementation process.9 4 The political nature of the monitoring
bodies, the state-driven compliance system, and the inability of other
States, individuals, and groups to invoke the protection of the
FCPNM greatly handicap its efforts to provide better protection of
religious minorities.9" Supported by the ECHR and a history of
influential human rights decisions, the Human Rights Convention
overshadows the FCPNM in definitively deciding issues and in
achieving compliance on the part of the Member States.96 However,
the Human Rights Convention's limited definition of "freedom of
religion" as well as the broad discretion it gives the States to limit the

92. See EVANS, supra note 36, at 208 (claiming that "[n]o judicial model of
religious freedom should ever give absolute primacy to the right to have and to
practise a religious belief').
93. See Boriss Cilevi s, The Framework Convention Within the Context of the
Council of Europe, in FILLING THE FRAME: FIVE YEARS OF MONITORING THE
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES 28, 37

(2004) (contending that, for the first time in history, respect for religious minorities
has been evaluated through FCPNM's impartial legal analysis).
94. See Albertie, supra note 6, at 975-76 (surmising that because the FCPNM's
provisions are not directly applicable to domestic legal systems it gives States wide
discretion in implementing the FCPNM's objectives).
95. See Furtado, supra note 27, at 369 (concluding that even if it reached its
fullest potential, the FCPNM's reporting system lacks the ability to enforce its
recommendations).
96. See Kevin Boyle, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 241, 242 (1995)
(reviewing THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

(1993)) (arguing that, despite the Council of Europe's advances in developing the
FCPNM, the Human Rights Convention remains the centerpiece of human rights
protection).
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to enforce the right to religious
same curbs the Court's ability
97
freedom to its fullest extent.

The implementation and monitoring mechanism established by the
FCPNM is loosely constructed and carries with it no defined
penalties for noncompliance.98 Because Member States largely drive
the process, the Advisory Committee is unlikely to get an unbiased
picture of the situation of religious minorities in the State and may
need to look to other sources for accurate information.99 The statecentric nature of the reporting process also disenfranchises
individuals and groups seeking relief for a violation of the
FCPNM. 0° Moreover, prior to publication, the reports must be
approved by the Committee of Ministers-a political body. The
Committee of Ministers makes a final determination and
recommendation based on the advice of the Advisory Committee.101
Given that the Committee of Ministers may be affected by political
concerns, the Advisory Committee's findings and recommendations
may not be neutral or impartial. 02 Additionally, given that the
Committee's recommendations are non-binding, the FCPNM is left

97. See Nathan A. Adams, IV, Human Rights Imperative: Extending Religious
Liberty Beyond the Border, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 52-53 (2000) (finding that
the discretion afforded to States in determining what is necessary to maintain
public order renders the protection afforded religious minorities against
discrimination ineffective).
98. See de Biirca, supra note 4, at 711-12 (recognizing that the FCPNM lacks
systematic or structured monitoring mechanisms).
99. See Sleeper, supra note 12, at 194-96 (providing the example of Romania,
which, despite being the first State to sign and ratify the FCPNM, failed to report
on any successful legislative action taken to comply with the FCPNM).
100. See Wippman, supra note 13, at 613 (recognizing that the FCPNM
protections occur through national legislation and policies rather than through an
interstate complaint procedure or an individual or minority group right of petition).
101. See Alyssa Haun, The Long Road: The Roma of Eastern and Central
Europe and the Freedom of Movement and Right to Choose a Residence, 33 GEO.
WASH. INT'L L. REV. 155, 189 (2000) (hypothesizing that the Committee of
Ministers may limit the FCPNM's efficacy by taking into account diplomatic,
economic, and strategic concerns when issuing recommendations).
102. See Furtado, supra note 27, at 368 (finding that despite pointing out State
shortcomings in implementing the FCPNM, the opinions' conclusions and
recommendations are rarely critical).
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with no effective enforcement mechanism in cases of
noncompliance. 103
The Advisory Committee's opinions illustrate the ineffectiveness
of the FCPNM's enforcement mechanism. Advisory Committee
opinions note intolerance and discrimination against religious
minorities within states and reiterate that the behavior is contrary to
the values of the FCPNM, yet outline only vague corrective
recommendations.0 4 These recommendations not only fail to address
State compliance effectively, they are of questionable value in
enforcing the principles of the FCPNM. °5 Even in the Advisory
Committee's second opinion on the Russian Federation, which took
an unusually strong step in condemning the State's actions, there is
little noticeable or significant strengthening of the Advisory
Committee's recommendations to remedy the violations. 10 6 Under the
jurisprudence of the ECHR, however, these issues of noncompliance
can be handled with more authority and, potentially, with more
effective enforcement.

10 7

103. See id. at 364-65 (noting that while the FCPNM uses "shall" in laying out
Member State obligations, it nonetheless allows States great flexibility in
implementing the FCPNM according to the limitations of their domestic law).
104. See Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection
of National Minorities, Opinion on the Czech Republic
48 (Apr. 6, 2001)
(suggesting simply "that the Czech authorities should take all necessary measures
to prevent" pervasive intolerance against religious minorities without any reference
to the types of measures to be undertaken); Advisory Committee on the
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Second Opinion
on the Russian Federation 138 (May 2, 2007) (recommending increased zeal in
the investigation and prosecution of religiously motivated crimes and punishment
of prosecutorial and police inaction).
105. Cf Mary Ellen Tsekos, Minority Rights: The Failure of InternationalLaw
to Protect the Roma, 9 HuM. RTS. BR. 26, 28 (2002) (noting that if the reporting
State has refused to acknowledge that the discrimination exists, the Advisory
Committee may not make recommendations to resolve the discrimination).
106. See Second Opinion on the Russian Federation, supra note 104, 314
(stating that the authorities of the Russian Federation are "invited" to adopt the
recommendations of the advisory committee).
107. Compare Opinion on Romania, supra note 73,
19 (suggesting that the
Government of Romania "consider" further measures to improve relations between
minorities and the police), with Valsamis v. Greece, App. No. 21787/93, 24 Eur.
H.R. Rep 294, 37 (1996) (declaring that because the parade did not offend the
religious beliefs of the child, the parade did not amount to an interference with the
child's freedom of religion).
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Unlike the FCPNM, the Human Rights Convention's enforcement
mechanism has been highly successful at protecting individual rights
and encouraging State compliance with its decisions." °8 The ECHR's
ability to decide both fact-specific, contentious cases and issue
advisory opinions allows the Court to produce consistent,
authoritative rulings. These rulings and opinions have become the
basis for an extensive jurisprudence that guides the behavior of
Member States. Yet as noted by scholars, the ECHR's success has
increased the volume of cases, making maintaining this consistency
more difficult. 109

The ECHR's success may also be credited to the Court's judges.
The Human Rights Convention includes language designed to ensure
a high degree of impartiality as well as reduce any conflict of interest
or adverse political influence.' 10 All judicial candidates must possess
substantive legal knowledge and experience, and no Member State is
allowed the have more than one judge on the Court."' Furthermore,
unlike the FCPNM, the ECHR permits individual recourse outside
domestic legal systems, lessening the ability of Member States to
influence the outcome of internal discrimination against religious
minorities." 2
In deciding cases and issues, however, the ECHR retains no power
to ensure that the state follows through on the decision or to ensure
that the State reforms its laws to prevent future violations." 3 The
Court's approach leaves the resolution of the issue to the State and
does not provide a guarantee to the individual that the Court will
follow through without further resort to court proceedings.

108. See Klebes, supra note 2, at 78 (crediting the ECHR's success to its ability
to adapt the Human Rights Convention to reflect changing societal needs).
109. Shelton, supra note 7, at 148-49.
110. See Protocol No. 11, supra note 31, art. 21.
111. See Andrews, supra note 28, at 472.
112. See id. at 468 (noting the striking willingness of Council of Europe
Member States to permit ECHR jurisdiction over individuals' claims against the
Member State).
113. Protocol No. I], supra note 31, arts. 46, 54 (transferring to the Committee

of Ministers the supervisory role).
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C. DESPITE ITS FAILINGS IN ENFORCING THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS
MINORITIES, THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF NATIONAL MINORITIES STANDS IN A UNIQUE POSITION TO
FURTHER THE RIGHTS OF RELIGIOUS MINORITIES
Although the formal mechanisms of the FCPNM fail to provide an
effective mechanism for immediate protection of the rights of
religious minorities, the FCPNM's informal mechanism of
enforcement may actually further the FCPNM's goals in ways the
ECHR can not. As it stands, publication of judgments is the extent of
the ECHR's involvement in the issues it decides. Once the Court
adjudicates the matter, the State bears the responsibility of
implementing the decision.
The FCPNM's enforcement mechanism establishes a system by
which the prescribed reforms may be monitored. This system
includes cyclical reporting requirements for States. Each State must
keep the Secretary General and, by extension, the Committee of
Ministers abreast of its progress in addressing and remedying its
deficiencies under the FCPNM. 14 Given the nature of the
enforcement mechanism, the State is under no obligation to comply
with the Advisory Committee's recommendations, but the prospect
of future criticism for failing to do so may prompt State action to
correct deficiencies. Further, as the Advisory Committee recognizes
State progress in providing protections for religious minorities in its
reports, the State may wish to have its accomplishments highlighted
in an official, public document.
D. THE RELUCTANCE OF MEMBER STATES TO VEST THE COUNCIL
OF EUROPE WITH MORE POWER OVER DOMESTIC AFFAIRS
HINDERS ANY MOVE BY THE COUNCIL TO MODIFY THE
JURISDICTION OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

The effectiveness and authority with which the ECHR adjudicates
issues make changing the scope of its jurisprudence highly
contentious. Allowing the Court to enforce a more detailed set of
rights would allow the Court greater influence in domestic politics.115
114. FCPNM, supra note 9, art. 25.
115. See Klebes, supra note 2, at 76 (arguing that the Convention on Human
Rights trumps national law to the extent that it conflicts with obligations under that
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The FCPNM's status as a framework convention rather than a fullfledged convention illustrates the concern of Member States in
extending the rights protected by the ECHR. 1 6 Further, the ECHR
bears a heavy caseload".7 and may itself oppose any changes to its
current jurisprudence. As a result, integrating the FCPNM into the
Human Rights Convention would be a challenge for the Council of

Europe.' 18

III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Ideally, the Council of Europe should work toward creating a
system that incorporates the FCPNM into the jurisprudence of the
ECHR while balancing the interests of the Member States in
retaining control of their domestic affairs. 119 Given that such a
prospect would likely face opposition from Member States and the
Court alike, such a solution may be a long-term goal unlikely to
happen soon. 12 0 As a result, interim steps are necessary to ensure that
Member States and the Court are prepared for any such change to the
Court's jurisdiction.' 2

law); Wippman, supra note 13, at 613 (emphasizing that the FCPNM's "provisions
are not directly applicable in state parties' national law"); see also Valentine, supra
note 49, at 445 (linking an absence of a definition for national minorities in the
FCPNM to the Council of Europe's lack of consensus on a definition); Wippman,
supra note 13, at 614-15 (noting that the FCPNM is not the only European treaty
faced with such drafting problems; the European Charter for Regional and
Minority Languages experienced similar difficulties).
116. But see Wippman, supra note 13, at 613 (contending that unlike other
conventions, the FCPNM intentionally gives States broad discretion in determining
the means pursued to meet their obligations).
117. See EVANS, supra note 36, at 15-16 (noting that the Court's caseload has
increased significantly since the Court was established).
118. See Furtado, supra note 27, at 365-66 (acknowledging that the FCPNM
developed as a framework convention due to the reluctance of Member States to
conclude legally binding agreements on minority protection).
119. See id. at 369 (proffering that the convergence of the two treaties is the
natural evolution in protecting the rights of national minorities); Geoff Gilbert,
Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law?, 35 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 307, 317 (2002) (suggesting that all minorities treaties should seek to
guarantee equality and preservation of the minority groups' characteristics and
traditions).
120. See Cilevi s, supra note 93, at 33.
121. See id. at 33 (considering that it is unrealistic that minority rights will soon
become justiciable).
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A. REQUIRE ALL MEMBER STATES TO RATIFY THE FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

Despite the increasing importance of the FCPNM and the
requirement that all prospective Member States of the Council of
Europe ratify it, not all current Member States have.'22 Permitting
established Council Members such as France and Turkey to refrain
from ratifying the FCPNM contributes to the perception that it is an
optional instrument, impeding the Council's efforts to increase or
enforce compliance.' 23 The failure of current Member States to ratify
the FCPNM also jeopardizes the Council's credibility.' 24 The
Council's role in integrating prospective Member States is critical in
light of the eastward expansion of the EU. 12 5 Accordingly,
established Member States must commit to the FCPNM as they have
to the Council of Europe if they hope to maintain credibility and
authority.
B. INCREASE THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S INDEPENDENCE FROM
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS AND AUTHORITY TO ISSUE OPINIONS

The Advisory Committee is currently subordinate to the
Committee of Ministers, a political body, which reviews all Advisory
Committee opinions before they are published. 2 6 Submitting these
opinions to a political body lessens the independence and credibility
122. See Vessela V. Stoyanova, Comment, The Council of Europe'sMonitoring
Mechanisms and their Relation to Eastern European Member States'
Noncompliance, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 730, 767-68 (2005) (illustrating the
adverse impact on the integrity of the FCPNM due to this failure).
123. See Christophe Hillion, On Enlargement of the European Union: The
Discrepancy Between Membership Obligations and Accession Conditions as
Regards the Protection of Minorities, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 715, 719 (2004)
(noting general European discomfort with the concept of minority rights);
Stoyanova, supra note 122, at 767 (recognizing that though France has one of the
largest population of national minorities it has nonetheless failed to ratify the
FCPNM).
124. See Stoyanova, supra note 122, at 767-68 (emphasizing the while the
Council closely securitizes the compliance of Eastern European countries, it fails
to do the same with the Western European countries leading to accusations of
hypocrisy).
125. See Shelton, supra note 7, at 95-96 (suggesting that increasingly complex
questions will arise as regional efforts to address human rights concerns expand
into Eastern European countries).
126. FCPNM, supra note 9, arts. 25-26.
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of the report by increasing the probability that political concerns
affect the final product. 127 Separating the Advisory Committee from
the Committee of Ministers will increase the effectiveness of the
Committee's opinions and ensure that the principles of the FCPNM
eclipse political concerns.
The Advisory Committee should also be given greater power
128
beyond simply monitoring compliance with the FCPNM.
Constraining the Advisory Committee to publishing opinions solely
in response to State reports hinders the Advisory Committee's ability
to produce reports or opinions on common problems throughout the
Council of Europe.
C. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SHOULD TAKE A MORE ACTIVE
ROLE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT THEIR
OPINIONS ARE BASED ON ACCURATE INFORMATION

By turning to outside sources to verify State reports, the Advisory
Committee has been able to effectively assess problems even if they
have not been reported by the State.1 29 The Advisory Committee
should extend its efforts to validate the information given to it by a
State. In particular, the Advisory Committee should collaborate with
other international organizations promoting the rights of national
minorities in Europe. For example, the Committee on Security and
Cooperation in Europe ("CSCE"), the independent U.S. agency
charged with monitoring Member State compliance with the

principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe ("OSCE"), introduced a High Commissioner for National
Minorities in 1992 to ferret out problems related to the presence of

127. See Haun, supra note 101, at 189 (postulating that the Committee of
Ministers might "soften its criticism of a State Party in order to avoid the same
degree of scrutiny being directed at their own country's policies").
128. See John Packer, Situating the FrameworkConvention in a Wider Context:
Achievements and Challenges,in FILLING THE FRAME 48-49 (2004) (advocating for

a more proactive role for the Advisory Committee which includes providing States
with technical assistance, developing thematic reports and advisory opinions, and
drafting suggested policies and legislative options).
129. See Opinion on Azerbaijan, supra note 66, 25 (noting that the Advisory
Committee was able to counter Azerbaijan's assertions with credible information
from other sources).
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national minorities and to effectively resolve them. 3 ' Collaborating
with the CSCE, OSCE and other similar organizations may help the
Advisory Committee effectively compile its opinions on the situation
of religious minorities in Member States and prospective Member
States.
D. PERMIT INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS, AND OTHER STATES TO INVOKE
THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FRAMEWORK CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

The FCPNM should be amended to allow individuals and groups
to: (1) report violations of the FCPNM; (2) make timely reports to
the Council of Europe of potential noncompliance; and (3) allow
minority groups to protect their rights under the FCPNM more
effectively.' 31 Allowing groups and individuals to report violations of
the FCPNM will improve the FCPNM's effectiveness and ability to
address a full range of concerns on the part of religious minority
groups. 132
E. BRING CASES AND REQUEST ADVISORY OPINIONS FROM THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS ON PROTECTIONS FOR
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES AFFECTED BY NEUTRAL OR GENERAL
LAWS

To expand the Court's jurisprudence on religious minority issues,
the Committee of Ministers should request advisory opinions on the
interpretation of Article 9 of the Human Rights Convention and
general or neutral laws.'33 Consideration of these laws will help the

130. See COMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE, Helsinki
Summit Declaration,in THE HELSINKI DOCUMENT: THE CHALLENGES OF CHANGE

18-20 (1992).
131. See Valentine, supra note 49, at 446-48 (championing increased and timely
protection through inclusion of an individual and group right to petition the
government for redress).
132. See id. (arguing that providing a right of petition on a group basis
guarantees minorities equal representation in different national sectors, just as, for
example, affirmative action did in the United States).
133. Contra European Convention for Human Rights, supra note 5, Protocol II,
art. 1 (mandating that advisory opinions may not deal with any question relating to
the content or scope of the rights or freedoms defined in Section 1 of the Human
Rights Convention or with any other question which the Court or the Committee of
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Court expand its jurisprudence to encompass more than mere nondiscrimination and may further the protection of religious minorities.

IV. CONCLUSION
Given the impact of the Council of Europe in modifying and
unifying legal systems throughout Europe, the Council of Europe
stands to play an important role in the protection of religious
minorities as Europe grows increasingly diverse.1 34 With increasing
immigration into the EU, 35 Europe's religious landscape is
diversifying, and the increasing diversity has presented challenges
for governments throughout Europe.136 Implementing more stringent

policies and guidelines for State actors aimed at preserving the right
of religion will facilitate integration of religious minorities into the
European community. 37 This will be particularly important in

countries such as the successor states to the former Yugoslavia,
where religion divided the states to the point of civil war and
genocide.' 3 8 Only by adapting the Convention on Human Rights and
the Framework Convention to allow the Council of Europe to both

Ministers might consider in consequence of any proceeding instituted in
accordance with the Convention).
134. See Romano Prodi, President, European Comm'n, Speech at the New York
University Law School: Cultural Diversity and Shared Values (Nov. 4, 2003)
(noting that the EU is becoming increasingly diverse as immigrants from a myriad
of countries and ethnicities flock to it); see also Adams, supra note 97, at 64
(recognizing the critical nature of religious liberty to counter secessionist
movements organized on the basis of religious differences).
135. See Danchin, supra note 74, at 100 (correlating changes in the political
landscape of Eastern and Central Europe and increased mobility with the increase
in immigration).
136. See Adams, supra note 97, at 52-53 (noting that in recent years, Europe has
witnessed increasing animus toward religious minorities similar to the "political
hysteria surrounding McCarthyism in the United States"); see also Marina
Hadjioannou, The International Human Right to Culture: Reclamation of the
Cultural Identities of Indigenous Peoples Under International Law, 8 CHAP. L.
REv. 201, 202 (2005) (noting the increasing importance of cultural durability and
integrity in providing human rights protections).
137. See Adams, supra note 97, at 53 (contending that the ECHR has failed to
protect religious minorities from increased scrutiny by Council of Europe States);
see also supra Part III (concluding that stricter reporting mechanisms and
increased authority and autonomy for the Advisory Committee are necessary to
strengthen the FCPNM).
138. See Ward, supra note 11, at 531.
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regulate and protect religious minorities can true positive change
13 9

occur.

139. See Sleeper, supra note 12, at 204-05 (proffering that states must begin to
implement legal reforms that incorporate international norms and satisfy the
requirements of international treaties, including enforcement mechanisms that will
strengthen social reform and civil society).

